DEPARTMENT
SEMINAR
Randal
Burns
Johns Hopkins University
Department
of Computer Science
October 11,
2007
Computer Science Building, Room 151
4:00 PM
Faculty
Host:Gerome Miklau
"Auditing
Long-Term Archives Built on Untrusted Storage Systems"
Verifying the authenticity of data has emerged as a critical
issue when storing data on untrusted servers. In general, such systems
prevent storage servers from misrepresenting or modifying data by providing
authenticity checks when accessing data. However, archival storage requires
guarantees about the authenticity of data on storage, i.e. that a repository
possesses and can reproduce the correct data. It is insufficient to detect
that data have been modified or deleted when accessing the data, because
it may be too late to recover lost or
damaged data.
This talk presents provable data possession (PDP), which
establishes that a server possesses data without returning the data
to the client
(verifier). PDP generates probabilistic proofs of possession by
sampling random sets of blocks from the server, which drastically reduces
I/O costs. It also uses a constant amount of metadata at the client
to
verify the proof and transmits a small, constant amount of data
over
the network.
Thus, PDP supports large data sets in widely-distributed storage
systems. The talk will also address practical issues in the implementation
of
PDP in archival stores, such as using PDP in conjunction with replication
and erasure coding.
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