

DieHard: Probabilistic Memory Safety for Unsafe Programming Languages

Emery Berger Ben Zorn University of Massachusetts Microsoft Research Amherst



Problems with Unsafe Languages

- C, C++: pervasive apps, but langs.
 memory unsafe
- Numerous opportunities for security vulnerabilities, errors
 - Double free
 - Invalid free
 - Uninitialized reads
 - Dangling pointers
 - Buffer overflows (stack & heap)



Current Approaches

Unsound, may work or abort
 Windows, GNU libc, etc., Rx [Zhou]
 Unsound, will definitely continue
 Failure oblivious [Rinard]
 Sound, definitely aborts (fail-safe)
 CCured [Necula], CRED [Ruwase & Lam],

- *SAFECode* [Dhurjati, Kowshik & Adve]
 - Requires C source, programmer intervention
 - 30% to 20X slowdowns
- Good for debugging, less for deployment



Probabilistic Memory Safety

DieHard: correct execution in face of errors with high probability

- Fully-randomized memory manager
 - Increases odds of benign memory errors
 - Ensures different heaps across users

Replication

- Run multiple replicas simultaneously, vote on results
 - Detects crashing & non-crashing errors

Trades space for increased reliability



Soundness for "Erroneous" Programs

- Normally: memory errors $\Rightarrow \perp \dots$
- Consider infinite-heap allocator:
 All news fresh; ignore delete
 - No dangling pointers, invalid frees, double frees
 - Every object infinitely large
 - No buffer overflows, data overwrites
- Transparent to correct program
- "Erroneous" programs sound




Approximating Infinite Heaps

- Infinite ⇒ M-heaps: probabilistic soundness
- Pad allocations & defer deallocations
 + Simple
 - No protection from larger overflows
 - pad = 8 bytes, overflow = 9 bytes...
 - Deterministic: overflow crashes everyone
- Better: randomize heap
 - + Probabilistic protection against errors
 - + Independent across heaps
 - ? Efficient implementation...




Implementation Choices

Conventional, freelist-based heaps
 Hard to randomize, protect from errors
 Double frees, heap corruption
 What about bitmaps? [Wilsongo]
 Catastrophic fragmentation
 Each small object likely to occupy one page






Randomized Heap Layout



- Bitmap-based, segregated size classes
 - Bit represents one object of given size
 - i.e., one bit = 2ⁱ⁺³ bytes, etc.
 - Prevents fragmentation



Randomized Allocation




malloc(8):

- compute size class = ceil($\log_2 sz$) 3
- randomly probe bitmap for zero-bit (free)
- Fast: runtime O(1)
 - M=2 \Rightarrow E[# of probes] \leq 2



Randomized Allocation




malloc(8):

- compute size class = ceil($\log_2 sz$) 3
- randomly probe bitmap for zero-bit (free)
- Fast: runtime O(1)
 - M=2 \Rightarrow E[# of probes] \leq 2




Randomized Deallocation



- free(ptr):
 - Ensure object valid aligned to right address
 - Ensure allocated bit set
 - Resets bit
- Prevents invalid frees, double frees




Randomized Deallocation



- free(ptr):
 - Ensure object valid aligned to right address
 - Ensure allocated bit set
 - Resets bit
- Prevents invalid frees, double frees




Randomized Deallocation



- free(ptr):
 - Ensure object valid aligned to right address
 - Ensure allocated bit set
 - Resets bit
- Prevents invalid frees, double frees



Randomized Heaps & Reliability



My Mozilla: "malignant" overflow


Objects randomly spread across heap
 Different run = different heap
 Errors across heaps *independent*







DieHard software architecture



- Each replica has different allocator
- "Output equivalent" kill failed replicas


<u>Results</u>

Analytical results (pictures!)
 Buffer overflows

- Dangling pointer errors
- Uninitialized reads
- Empirical results
 - Runtime overhead
 - Error avoidance
 - Injected faults & actual applications




- Model overflow as write of live data
 - Heap half full (max occupancy)






- Model overflow as write of live data
 - Heap half full (max occupancy)






- Model overflow as write of live data
 - Heap half full (max occupancy)



$$P(No \text{ Overflow}) \geq \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)$$




Replicas: Increase odds of avoiding overflow in at least one replica






Replicas: Increase odds of avoiding overflow in at least one replica






Replicas: Increase odds of avoiding overflow in at least one replica



- P(Overflow in all replicas) = $(1/2)^3 = 1/8$ • P(No overflow in > 1 replica) = $1 - (1/2)^3 = 7$
 - P(No overflow in \geq 1 replica) = 1-(1/2)³ = 7/8





Overflow one object




3

4

Pepilkas

6


5



Empirical Results: Runtime

Runtime on Linux

🖬 malloc 📕 GC 🗖 Die Hard



UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST • Department of Computer Science • PLDI 2006

Empirical Results: Error Avoidance

Injected faults:

- Dangling pointers (@50%, 10 allocations)
 - glibc: crashes; DieHard: 9/10 correct
 - Overflows (@1%, 4 bytes over)
 - glibc: crashes 9/10, inf loop; DieHard: 10/10 correct

Real faults:

- Avoids Squid web cache overflow
 - Crashes BDW & glibc
- Avoids dangling pointer error in Mozilla
 - DoS in glibc & Windows



Conclusion


Randomization + replicas = probabilistic memory safety

- Improves over today (o%)
- Useful point between absolute soundness (fail-stop) and unsound

Trades hardware resources (RAM,CPU) for reliability

- Hardware trends
 - Larger memories, multi-core CPUs
- Follows in footsteps of ECC memory, RAID





DieHard software

http://www.cs.umass.edu/~emery/diehard

Linux, Solaris (stand-alone & replicated) Windows (stand-alone only)

