

Recall From Last Time

Gödel's Completeness Theorem of First-Order Logic

For all first-order formulas, φ , and sets of first-order formulas, Γ ,

$$\Gamma \models \varphi \iff \Gamma \vdash \varphi$$

From now on we use the following notation:

$$\mathcal{A} \models \varphi$$

$$\Gamma \vdash \varphi$$

Compactness Theorem:

Let Γ be a set of first-order formulas.

Suppose every finite subset of Γ has a model.

Then Γ has a model.

Proof: Suppose that Γ is inconsistent, i.e., $\Gamma \vdash \perp$

Then since proofs are finite, there is a finite subset $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma$
s.t. $\Gamma_0 \vdash \perp$.

Since Γ_0 is finite, it has a model, $\mathcal{A} \models \Gamma_0$

Thus, by the Soundness Theorem, $\mathcal{A} \models \perp$

$\Rightarrow \Leftarrow$ Thus Γ is consistent.

By the Completeness Theorem, Γ has a model. □

Compactness Applications

$$\text{Theory}(\mathbf{N}) = \{\varphi \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma_N) \mid \mathbf{N} \models \varphi\}$$

$$\Gamma = \text{Theory}(\mathbf{N}) \cup \{c > 0, c > 1, c > 2, c > 3, \dots\}$$

Claim: Γ has a model, $N' \models \Gamma$

Proof: Every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable by (\mathbf{N}, i) for i sufficiently large. Thus, by Compactness, Γ is satisfiable. \square

Thus, there is a countable model,

$$N' \models \text{Theory}(\mathbf{N}); \quad N' \not\cong \mathbf{N}$$

Thus, $\mathcal{L}(\Sigma_N)$ cannot uniquely characterize \mathbf{N} .

“Connectedness” is not expressible in $\mathcal{L}(\Sigma_g)$

Proof: Suppose that $\chi \equiv$ “I am connected.”

$$\Gamma = \{\chi\} \cup \{\neg\text{dist}(s, t, 1), \neg\text{dist}(s, t, 2), \neg\text{dist}(s, t, 3), \dots\}$$

$$\text{dist}(x_0, x_n, n) \equiv \exists x_1 \cdots x_{n-1} \left(\bigwedge_{i=0}^{n-1} (x_i = x_{i+1} \vee E(x_i, x_{i+1})) \right)$$

Every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable.

By Compactness, Γ has a model, \mathcal{A} .

\mathcal{A} is not connected but $\mathcal{A} \models \chi$. $\Rightarrow \Leftarrow$



Thus “Connectedness” is not expressible in the first-order language of graphs.

Downward Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem:

If a set of first-order formulas, Γ , has **any model at all**, Then it has a **countable** model.

Proof: Suppose that Γ has a model.

By the Soundness Theorem, Γ is consistent.

By our proof of the Completeness Theorem, there is a model, \mathcal{A} of Γ whose universe consists of the equivalence classes of the witness constants: c_1, c_2, \dots , i.e., \mathcal{A} is countable. □

The set of real numbers is **uncountable**. But if we define a first-order vocabulary to talk about \mathbf{R} , we get a first-order theory, **Theory(\mathbf{R})**, the set of sentences that are true of \mathbf{R} . This theory has a countable model!

Kind of weird.

Zermelo Fraenkel Set Theory plus the Axiom of Choice

ZFC is a first-order axiomatization of set theory.

Extensionality: $\forall x, y (\forall z (z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y) \rightarrow x = y)$

If two sets have the same elements then they are equal

Empty Set: $\exists x \forall y (y \notin x)$

There is a (unique) empty set; let's call it \emptyset

Plus 7 more axioms . . .

“The reader should be reasonably convinced even on a first reading that the axioms easily encompass all of traditional mathematics,”

Paul J. Cohen, *Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis*

ZFC is something like what Hilbert was asking for.

Back to the Compactness Theorem

If **ZFC** is consistent, then it has a countable model, \mathcal{A} .

Thus, if you believe Paul Cohen, then \mathcal{A} is a model of all of mathematics. In particular, it has \mathbf{N} , $\wp(\mathbf{N})$, $\wp(\wp(\mathbf{N}))$, \dots

Furthermore, **ZFC** \vdash “ $\wp(\mathbf{N})$ is uncountable.”

Thus, $\mathcal{A} \models$ “ $\wp(\mathbf{N})$ is uncountable.”

How can this be, when all these sets are part of the countable universe, $|\mathcal{A}|$?

What does $\mathcal{A} \models \text{“}\wp(\mathbf{N}) \text{ is uncountable”}$ mean?

It means that there is no $f : \mathbf{N} \xrightarrow[\text{onto}]{1:1} \wp(\mathbf{N})$.

Now $\mathbf{N}^{\mathcal{A}}, \wp(\mathbf{N})^{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq |A|$, so they are both countable, so there is such an f .

However, $f \notin |\mathcal{A}|$

$\mathcal{A} \models \text{“}\wp(\mathbf{N}) \text{ is uncountable”}$

Formal Number Theory

$$\text{NT}_1 \equiv \forall x(\sigma(x) \neq 0)$$

$$\text{NT}_2 \equiv \forall xy(\sigma(x) = \sigma(y) \rightarrow x = y)$$

$$\text{NT}_3 \equiv \forall x(x = 0 \vee \exists y(\sigma(y) = x))$$

$$\text{NT}_4 \equiv \forall x(x + 0 = x)$$

$$\text{NT}_5 \equiv \forall xy(x + \sigma(y) = \sigma(x + y))$$

$$\text{NT}_6 \equiv \forall x(x \times 0 = 0)$$

$$\text{NT}_7 \equiv \forall xy(x \times \sigma(y) = (x \times y) + x)$$

$$\text{NT}_8 \equiv \forall x(x \uparrow 0 = 1)$$

$$\text{NT}_9 \equiv \forall xy(x \uparrow \sigma(y) = (x \uparrow y) \times x)$$

$$\text{NT}_{10} \equiv \forall x(x < \sigma(x))$$

$$\text{NT}_{11} \equiv \forall xy(x < y \rightarrow \sigma(x) \leq y)$$

$$\text{NT}_{12} \equiv \forall xy(\neg(x < y) \leftrightarrow y \leq x)$$

$$\text{NT}_{13} \equiv \forall xyz((x < y \wedge y < z) \rightarrow x < z)$$

$$\text{NT}_{14} \equiv \forall xy(\neg(x < 0) \wedge ((\sigma(x) < \sigma(y)) \rightarrow x < y))$$

$$\mathbf{N} \models \mathbf{NT} = \bigwedge_{i=1}^{14} \mathbf{NT}_i$$

Th 6.1 [Papa]: Let φ have no variables. Then

$$\mathbf{N} \models \varphi \iff \mathbf{NT} \vdash \varphi$$

Proof: φ is a boolean combination of $t < t'$, $t = t'$.

Case 1: t, t' numbers: $\sigma(\sigma \cdots \sigma(0) \cdots)$.

= use $\mathbf{NT}_1, \mathbf{NT}_2$

< use $\mathbf{NT}_{10}, \mathbf{NT}_{13}, \mathbf{NT}_{14}$

Case 2: t, t' involve $+$, \times , \uparrow .

Use $\mathbf{NT}_4, \dots, \mathbf{NT}_9$ to transform these to numbers. □

Definition

A formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma_N)$ is **bounded** iff it can be written with all quantifiers in front, and **all universal quantifiers bounded**.

Example:

$$\forall x < 9 \exists y \forall z < 2 \uparrow (x \times y) (x \uparrow 3 + z \uparrow 3 \neq 17)$$

Remark: If $\varphi(v)$ is bounded and has only one free variable, v , then S_φ is r.e., where,

$$S_\varphi = \{n \in \mathbf{N} \mid \mathbf{N} \models \varphi(n)\} .$$

Th 6.2 [Papa]: Let φ be a bounded sentence, i.e., no free variables. Then, $\mathbf{N} \models \varphi \iff \mathbf{NT} \vdash \varphi$.

Proof: \Leftarrow : Soundness Theorem.

\Rightarrow : induction on number of quantifiers in φ .

Assume: $\mathbf{N} \models \varphi$.

Base case: Th 6.1

Inductive step: $\varphi \equiv \exists x(\psi(x))$.

Thus, $\mathbf{N} \models \psi(n)$, for some $n \in \mathbf{N}$.

Thus, $\mathbf{NT} \vdash \psi(n)$

Thus, $\mathbf{NT} \vdash \varphi$.

Inductive step: $\varphi \equiv \forall x < t (\psi(x))$.

t is a closed term, thus, $\mathbf{NT} \vdash t = n$, for some $n \in \mathbf{N}$.

$\mathbf{NT}_{10}, \mathbf{NT}_{11}, \mathbf{NT}_{14} \vdash (x < n \rightarrow x = 0 \vee x = 1 \vee \dots \vee x = n - 1)$

$\mathbf{N} \models \psi(i), \quad i = 0, \dots, n - 1$

$\mathbf{NT} \vdash \psi(i), \quad i = 0, \dots, n - 1$

$\mathbf{NT} \vdash \varphi$



Definition

Let $f : \mathbf{N}^k \rightarrow \mathbf{N}$. Formula φ_f represents f iff
for all $n_1, \dots, n_k, m \in \mathbf{N}$,

$$f(n_1, \dots, n_k) = m \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathbf{N} \models \varphi_f(n_1, \dots, n_k, m)$$

Example: $f(n) = n^2 + 1$.

Let $\varphi_f(n, m) \equiv (n \times n) + 1 = m$.

$$\mathbf{N} \models \varphi_f(n, m) \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathbf{N} \models (n \times n) + 1 = m \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad f(n) = m$$

To Do Next:

Th: Every primitive recursive function is representable by a bounded formula.

Cor: K is representable by a bounded formula.

Th: FO-THEOREMS is r.e. complete.

Gödel's Incompleteness Th: There is no r.e. set of sentences Γ such that

- $\mathbf{N} \models \Gamma$, and
- $\Gamma \vdash \text{Theory}(\mathbf{N})$.

Lemma: Primitive Recursive relations: Prime, PR, IsSeq, length, and ItemR are representable by bounded formulas.

Proof: $\text{PR}(n, p)$ asserts that p is prime number n , by asserting that there exists a number,

$$s = 2^0 \times 3^1 \times 5^2 \times 7^3 \times 11^4 \times \dots \times p^n$$

$$x|y \equiv \exists z < y + 1 (x \times z = y)$$

$$\text{DE}(x, e, y) \equiv x^e|y \wedge x^{e+1} \not|y$$

$$\text{Prime}(x) \equiv x > 1 \wedge \forall y, z < x (y \times z \neq x)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{PR}(n, p) \equiv & \exists s (\text{Prime}(p) \wedge 2 \not|s \wedge \text{DE}(p, n, s) \wedge \\ & \forall q \leq p \forall q' < q (\neg \text{Prime}(q) \vee \neg \text{Prime}(q') \\ & \vee \exists q'' < q (q' < q'' \wedge \text{Prime}(q'')) \\ & \vee \exists e < q (\text{DE}(q', e, s) \wedge \text{DE}(q, e + 1, s)))) \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{IsSeq}(x) \equiv \exists z < x \forall i < x \exists p < 2 \uparrow x (\mathbf{PR}(i, p) \wedge ((i \leq z + 1 \wedge p|x) \vee (i > z + 1 \wedge \neg p|x)))$$

$$\text{length}(x, \ell) \equiv \exists k, p, q (\text{IsSeq}(x) \wedge k + 1 = \ell \wedge \mathbf{PR}(k, p) \wedge \mathbf{PR}(\ell, q) \wedge p|x \wedge q \not|x)$$

$$\text{ItemR}(x, i, e) \equiv \exists p (\text{IsSeq}(x) \wedge \mathbf{PR}(i, p) \wedge \mathbf{DE}(p, e + 1, x))$$



Th: Every Bloop function is represented by a bdd. formula.

Proof:

Base case: Obvious for initial function, s , and constant 0.

Inductive step: Assignment statement: Suppose that we are in a function definition: **def** $f(x_1, \dots, x_k)$

$$v = g(y_1, \dots, y_r)$$

where inductively we may assume that g and y_1, \dots, y_r are represented by bdd. formulas.

$$\varphi_v(\bar{x}, v) \equiv \exists y_1, \dots, y_r (\varphi_g(\bar{y}, v) \wedge \varphi_{y_1}(\bar{x}, y_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \varphi_{y_r}(\bar{x}, y_r))$$

Inductive step:

a.times do

$$0. \quad v_0 = f_0(\bar{x}, \bar{v})$$

$$1. \quad v_1 = f_1(\bar{x}, \bar{v})$$

...

$$k - 1. \quad v_{k-1} = f_{k-1}(\bar{x}, \bar{v})$$

end

To represent v_k after the *a.times* loop, we assert:

$$\exists s (\text{IsSeq}(s) \wedge \text{length}(s, a \times k) \wedge \forall i \leq k \forall j \leq a (\psi(s, i, j)))$$

where $\psi(s, i, j)$ asserts that item $j \times a + i$ of s is equal to $f_i(\bar{x}, \bar{v})$

and the v_ℓ are the appropriate previous values from s . □

Cor: K is representable by a bounded formula.

$$\varphi_K(n) \equiv \exists c (\mathbf{COMP}(n, n, c, 1))$$

$$K = \{n \mid \mathbf{N} \models \varphi_K(n)\}$$

$$K = \{n \mid \mathbf{NT} \vdash \varphi_K(n)\}$$

Summary So Far: $\mathbf{NT} = \bigwedge_{i=1}^{14} \mathbf{NT}_i$

Definition: A formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma_N)$ is *bounded* iff it can be written with all quantifiers in front, and all universal quantifiers bounded.

Theorem 6.2 [Papa]: Let φ be a bounded sentence. Then

$$\mathbf{N} \models \varphi \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathbf{NT} \vdash \varphi$$

Definition: φ_f represents f iff for all $n_1, \dots, n_k, m \in \mathbf{N}$,

$$f(n_1, \dots, n_k) = m \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathbf{N} \models \varphi_f(n_1, \dots, n_k, m)$$

Theorem: Every primitive recursive function is representable by a bounded formula.

Corollary: K is representable by a bounded formula.

$$\varphi_K(n) \equiv \exists c(\mathbf{COMP}(n, n, c, 1))$$

$$K = \{n \mid \mathbf{N} \models \varphi_K(n)\}$$

$$K = \{n \mid \mathbf{NT} \vdash \varphi_K(n)\}$$

Sameer's Corollary: S is representable by a bounded formula iff S is r.e.

$$W_i = \{n \mid M_i(n) = 1\} = \{n \mid \mathbf{NT} \vdash \exists c(\mathbf{COMP}(i, n, c, 1))\}$$

Def: For a structure $\mathcal{A} \in \text{STRUC}[\Sigma]$,

$$\text{Theory}(\mathcal{A}) = \{\varphi \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma) \mid \mathcal{A} \models \varphi\}$$

$$\text{Theory}(\mathbf{N}) = \{\varphi \in \mathcal{L}(\Sigma_N) \mid \mathbf{N} \models \varphi\}$$

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem: There is no r.e. set of sentences Γ such that

1. $\mathbf{N} \models \Gamma$, and
2. $\Gamma \vdash \text{Theory}(\mathbf{N})$.

There is no axiomatization of number theory, much less all of mathematics.

Proof: Let Γ be r.e. and $\mathbf{N} \models \Gamma$.

$$S = \{n \in \mathbf{N} \mid \Gamma \vdash \neg\varphi_K(n)\}$$

S is r.e. and $S \subseteq \overline{K}$.

Intuitively, $S = \{n \in \mathbf{N} \mid \Gamma \vdash n \in \overline{K}\}$

Since \overline{K} is not r.e., there exist infinitely many $n \in \mathbf{N}$ s.t.,

$$\mathbf{N} \models \neg\varphi_K(n) \quad \text{and} \quad \Gamma \not\vdash \neg\varphi_K(n) \quad \square$$

Th: FO-THEOREMS is r.e. complete.

Proof: We have already seen that FO-THEOREMS is r.e..

Recall K is represented by bounded formula φ_K .

$$n \in K \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathbf{N} \models \varphi_K(n) \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathbf{NT} \vdash \varphi_K(n)$$

$$n \in K \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \text{“NT} \rightarrow \varphi_K(n)\text{”} \in \text{FO-THEOREMS}$$

Thus, $K \leq \text{FO-THEOREMS}$.

$$f(n) = \text{NT} \rightarrow \varphi_K(n)$$



Sketch of Gödel's Original Proof

- Encode symbols as natural numbers.
- Encode formulas as finite sequences of natural numbers.
- Encode proofs as finite sequences of formulas.

- Let Γ be a primitive recursive axiomatization of some portion of mathematics including number theory.

The following predicates are primitive recursive and thus definable by bounded first-order formulas:

- $\text{Formula}(x)$: “ x is the number of a formula”
- $\text{Axiom}(x)$: “ x is the number of an axiom”
- $\text{Proof}(x)$: “ x is the number of a proof”
- $\text{Theorem}(x)$: “ x is the number of a theorem”

- Let R_0, R_1, \dots list all formulas from $\mathcal{L}(\Sigma_N)$ with one free variable, i.e., all first-order definable sets.
- Let $G = \{n \mid \neg \text{Theorem}(R_n(n))\}$
- $G = \{n \mid R_q(n)\}$ for some q
- $R_q(q) \equiv \neg \text{Theorem}(R_q(q)) \equiv \text{“I am not a theorem”}$
- If $R_q(q)$ then $\Gamma \not\vdash R_q(q)$; If $\neg R_q(q)$ then $\Gamma \vdash R_q(q)$.

