

CMPSCI 690RA: Randomized Algorithms

Lecture 4 – Principle of Deferred Decisions & Stable Matchings

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Outline

Clock Solitaire and Principle of Deferred Decisions

Stable Matching Problem

Probabilistic Analysis of Gale-Shapley Algorithm

Recall Last Week's Puzzle

- ▶ Take a standard pack of 52 cards that is randomly shuffled.
- ▶ Split into 13 piles of 4 and label piles $\{A, 2, \dots, 10, J, Q, K\}$.
- ▶ Take first card from "K" pile.
- ▶ Take next card from "X" pile where X is the face value of the previous card taken.
- ▶ Repeat until either all cards are removed (**you win**) or we get stuck (**you lose**).

What's the probability you win?

Structural Observations

Lemma

The last card before we terminate (either winning or losing) is K.

Proof.

- ▶ Suppose at iteration j we draw card X but pile "X" is empty.
- ▶ If pile "X" is empty and $X \neq K$ then we have already drawn 4 copies of card X prior to iteration j . Contradiction!



Lemma

We win iff the fourth K is the 52nd card.

Proof.

- ▶ When 1st, 2nd, or 3rd K is seen we don't terminate because "K" pile is non-empty.
- ▶ Terminate when 4th K is seen: we win iff it's the 52nd card.



Principle of Deferred Decisions

- ▶ How do we compute the probability that the fourth K is the 52nd card? \mathbb{P} [fourth K is 52nd card] equals:

$$\frac{\# \text{ game configurations such that K is 52nd card revealed}}{\# \text{ game configurations}}$$

- ▶ **Principle of Deferred Decisions:** Let the random choices unfold with the progress of the analysis rather than fixing random events upfront.
- ▶ For clock solitaire this means we may assume that at each draw, any unseen card is equally unlikely.

Theorem

The probability we win clock solitaire is 1/13.

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Stable Matching Problem

There are n job openings (j_1, \dots, j_n) and n applicants (a_1, \dots, a_n) .

- ▶ A **matching** is a 1 – 1 correspondence between jobs and applicants.
- ▶ Each job has a (strict) preference list for the applicants and each applicant has a (strict) preference list for the jobs.
- ▶ A matching is **unstable** if there exists job j and applicant a such that
 1. j and a are not matched to each other.
 2. j prefers a to their current employee.
 3. a prefers j to their current job.
- ▶ A configuration that is not unstable is **stable**.

Does a stable matching always exist? Can we find one efficiently?

The Gale-Shapley Algorithm

- ▶ Let i be the smallest value such that a_i is unemployed.
- ▶ a_i applies to the most desirable employer (according to their list) that hasn't already rejected them
- ▶ The jobs accepts then if either a) the job is currently unfilled, or b) a_i is more desirable than the current employee (in which case the current employee becomes unemployed.)
- ▶ Repeat until there are no unemployed applicants left.

Does the algorithm terminate? Is the resulting matching stable?

Algorithm is Well-Defined

Lemma

Whenever there's an unemployed candidate a_i , there is a job he/she hasn't applied to.

Proof.

- ▶ Once a job has an employee, the job is doesn't become unfilled.
- ▶ Therefore, all the jobs to which a_i applied are filled.
- ▶ If a_i has applied to all jobs, all the jobs are filled, hence all the applicants are employed. Contradiction!



Algorithm is Efficient

Theorem

The algorithm terminates after $O(n^2)$ repeats.

Proof.

- ▶ At each stage of the algorithm, let t_i be the number of jobs to which a_i could still potentially apply.
- ▶ At each step $\sum_{i \in [n]} t_i$ decreases by 1.
- ▶ Initially $\sum_{i \in [n]} t_i = n^2$ so there can be at most n^2 steps.



Algorithm is Correct

Theorem

The matching found by the Gale-Shapley algorithm is stable.

Proof.

- ▶ Proof by contradiction: Suppose matching includes $a-j$ and $a'-j'$ but a and j' prefer to be matched to each other.
- ▶ Since a prefers j' to j , he/she must have applied to j' before he applied to j .
- ▶ But at that point, j' must prefer its current match to a : either it already had a better match when a applied or it matched a initially and then got a better proposal. Contradiction!



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Probabilistic Analysis

- ▶ In **randomized algorithms**, we consider algorithms that make random choices and investigate what happens when they process a “fixed input.” E.g., the 2SAT algorithm from lecture 1.
- ▶ In **probabilistic analysis**, we consider random input and investigate what happens when it’s processed by a fixed algorithm. E.g., the Gale-Shapley algorithm when the preference lists are random.

Theorem

If the preference lists are random, the expected number of iterations of Gale-Shapley is $\leq nH_n$.

Probabilistic Analysis of Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1/2)

- ▶ **Principle of deferred decision:** we may assume that at each step a_i applies to a job chosen uniformly at random from the jobs that have not yet rejected the applicant.
- ▶ To simplify things, use a modification of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, the “**amnesiac**” algorithm.
 - ▶ At each step, a_i applies to a job uniformly at random from the set of all n jobs.
 - ▶ This doesn't change the outcome of the algorithm since, if a_i was rejected a job before, they'll be rejected again.
 - ▶ The expected running time of the modified algorithm is an upper bound for the running time of original algorithm.

Probabilistic Analysis of Gale-Shapley Algorithm (2/2)

Theorem

If the preference lists are random, the expected number of iterations of Gale-Shapley is at most nH_n .

Proof.

Since the algorithm terminates once all jobs have received at least one applicant, the random process is analogous to the coupon collector problem. □